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Abstract
I examine the implementation of emission policy in a union of coun-
tries. Production in any country incurs emissions that pollute all over
the union, but efficiency in production can be improved by research
and development (R&D). I compare four cases: laissez-faire, Pareto
optimal policy, lobbying with centrally-determined emission quotas
and lobbying with emission trade. The main findings are as follows.
With emission quotas, the growth rate is socially optimal, but wel-
fare sub-optimal. Emission trade speeds up growth from the initial
position of laissez-faire, but slows down from the initial position of
centrally-determined emission quotas.
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1 Introduction
In this study, I examine the implementation of emission policy in a union
of countries. The production of goods in any country incurs emissions that
pollute all over the union, but efficiency in production in each country can
be improved by research and development which has a random outcome. In
every country, there is a local planner that maximizes welfare and has enough
instrument to control the allocation of resources in the country. In the union,
there are common environmental regulations that compel local planners to
spend some of their resources to pollution abatement.
In particular, I examine the following cases of exercising emission policy:
(i) Laissez-faire. All countries choose their optimal emissions ignoring the
externality through pollution.
(ii) Pareto optimum. In the union, there is a benevolent central planner that
sets emission quotas for all member and is able to transfer resources
between countries.
(iii) Lobbying without emission trade. In the union, there is a self-interested
central planner that sets emission quotas for all countries. That planner
is subject to lobbying and has no financial resources of its own.
(iv) Lobbying with emission trade. In the union, there is a self-interested
central planner that sets emission quotas for all countries, and a market
through which the countries can sell their quotas to each others. The
central planner is subject to lobbying and has no financial resources.
In this model, there are two sources of inefficiency. One is negative exter-
nality through pollution, for which a single country has too much production
with emissions and too little investment in R&D. The second externality
is waste due to lobbying. Given that the central planner consists at least
partly of different households than the rest of the population, political con-
tributions are waste from the viewpoint of the latter. The relative weight of
these sources determine the outcome of the comparison between cases (i)-(iv).
The impact of any environmental policy depends crucially on the exis-
tence of uncertainty. The papers Corsetti (1997), Smith (1996), Turnovsky
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(1995,1999) consider public policy by a growth model where productivity
shocks follows a Wiener process. Soretz (2003) applies that approach to en-
vironmental policy. In one of my earlier publications (Palokangas 2008), I
examine an economic union where member countries produce emissions in
fixed proportion to labor in production and where uncertainty is embodied
in technological change in the form of Poisson processes. As a result of this,
I obtain Pareto-optimal emission taxes for the member countries. In this
paper, I modify Palokangas’ (2008) model so that (i) the central planner is
self-interested and (ii) labor and emissions are different inputs in production.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the general
structure of the union and a single country. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 examine
the cases (i)-(iv) above, respectively.
2 The union
I consider a union of fixed number n of similar countries. Each country
j ∈ {1, ..., n} has a fixed labor supply L, of which the amount lj is used in
production and the rest
zj = L− lj (1)
in R&D. I assume that all countries j ∈ {1, ..., n} produce the same good,
for simplicity.1 The total supply of the consumption good in the union, y, is
the sum of the outputs yj of all the member countries:
y =
n∑
j=1
yj. (2)
Let mj be emissions in country j and P be pollution in the union. I assume
that pollution is determined by total emissions in the union,
∑n
j=1mj:
P =
n∑
j=1
mj. (3)
1With some complication, but with no significant effect on the results, it would be
possible to assume as well that the final consumption good is composed of the outputs of
all countries through CES technology.
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The bigger the number of countries, n, the bigger the negative externality
through pollution. Fos this reason, I say that the decision making in the
union is the more centralized (de-centralized), the smaller (bigger) n.
All households in the union share the same preferences and take income,
prices and the interest rate r as given. Thus, they all behave as if there
were a single representative household for the whole union. The household
chooses its flow of consumption C to maximize its utility starting at time T ,∫ ∞
T
(log C)e−ρ(θ−T )dθ,
where θ is time and ρ > 0 the constant rate of time preference. This utility
maximization leads to the Euler equation (cf. Grossman and Helpman 1994b)
E˙
E =
dE
dt
1
E = r − ρ with E
.
= pC, (4)
where p the consumption price, E household spending and r the interest rate.
The goods market is in equilibrium, if the supply y equals the demand C.
Because in the model there is no money that would pin down the nominal
price level at any time, it is convenient to normalize the households’ total
consumption expenditure in the common market, E , at unity. From y = C,
E = 1, (2) and (4) it then follows that the interest rate r is constant:
E = 1, p = 1
C
=
1
y
= 1
/ n∑
j=1
yj, r = ρ > 0. (5)
3 The countries
Each country j consists of the production sector, which makes the consump-
tion good, and the abatement sector, which uses resources to meet the envi-
ronment regulations in the union. Because pollution P employs resources in
the abatement sector, it decreases production yj. I assume that the marginal
rate of substitution between production and pollution is given by
∂yj/∂P = −δyj/P, (6)
where δ > 0 is a constant. The efficiency of production in country j is aγj ,
where a > 1 is a constant and γj is the serial number of technology. In the
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advent of technological change in country j, this efficiency increases from aγj
to aγj+1. Noting this and (6), total output in country j is a function of labor
input lj, emissions mj and the level of productivity, a
γj , as follows:
yj = a
γjf(lj,mj)P
−δ, fl
.
= ∂f/∂lj > 0, fm
.
= ∂f/∂mj > 0,
fll
.
=
∂2f
∂l2j
< 0, flm
.
=
∂2f
∂lj∂mj
> 0, fmm
.
=
∂2f
∂m2j
< 0,
flfm
flmf
= σ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞), mjfm(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
=
mj
lj
fm(lj/mj, 1)
f(lj/mj, 1)
.
= ξ
(mj
lj
)
,
ljfl(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
= 1− mjfm(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
, ξ′
(mj
lj
){ > 0 for σ > 1,
< 0 for σ < 1,
(7)
where f is a CES production function, σ the constant elasticity of substitu-
tion between labor and emissions, δ the constant elasticity of output with
respect to pollution and P−δ the abatement factor.
The local planner in country j (hereafter local planner j) pays political
contributions Rj to the central planner of the union. Real income in country j
is therefore given by yj−Rj, where yj is output and Rj political contributions.
Noting (7), I obtain local planner j’s utility from an infinite stream of real
income beginning at time T as follows:
E
∫ ∞
T
(yj −Rj)e−r(t−T )dt = E
∫ ∞
T
[
aγjf(lj,mj)P
−δ −Rj
]
e−r(t−T )dt, (8)
where E is the expectation operator and r > 0 the interest rate [cf. (5)].
The improvement of technology in country j depends on labor devoted
to R&D, zj. In a small period of time dt, the probability that R&D leads to
development of a new technology is given by λzjdt, while the probability that
R&D remains without success is given by 1− λzjdt, where λ is productivity
in R&D. Noting (1), this defines a Poisson process χj with
dχj =
{
1 with probability λzjdt = λ(L− lj)dt,
0 with probability 1− λzjdt = 1− λ(L− lj)dt, (9)
where dχj is the increment of the process χj. The expected growth rate of
productivity aγj in the production sector in the stationary state is given by
gj
.
= E
[
log aγ+1 − log aγ] = (log a)λzj = (log a)λ(L− lj),
where E is the expectation operator (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1998), p. 59,
and Wa¨lde (1999). In other words:
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Proposition 1 The expected growth rate gj of country j’s output is in fixed
proportion to labor devoted to R&D, zj = L− lj, in that country.
Given this result, I can use labor devoted to R&D, zj, as a proxy for the
growth rate in each country j.
4 Laissez-faire
If there is laissez-faire, there is no lobbying and no political contributions
either, Rj = 0 for all j. Local planner j then maximizes its utility (8) by
emissions mj and labor input lj subject to Poisson technological change (9),
given emissions in the rest of the union,
m−j
.
=
∑
k 6=j
mk. (10)
The value of the optimal program for planner j starting at time T is then
Ωj(γj,m−j, n, T )
.
= max
(mj , lj) s.t. (9)
E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δe−r(t−T )dt.
(11)
I denote Ωj = Ωj(γj,m−j, n, T ) and Ω˜j = Ωj(γj + 1,m−j, n, T ). The
Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program (11) is
rΩj = max
mj ,lj
Φj(mj, lj, γj,m−j, n, T ), (12)
where
Φj(mj, lj, γj,m−j, n, T ) = aγjf(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ + λ(L− lj)
[
Ω˜j − Ωj].
(13)
This leads to the first-order conditions
∂Φj
∂mj
=
aγjfm(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− δa
γjf(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ+1
= 0, (14)
∂Φj
∂lj
=
aγjfl(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− λ[Ω˜j − Ωj] = 0. (15)
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To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Ωj, is in fixed proportion ϕj > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Ωj(γj,m−j, n, T ) = ϕjaγjf(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ. (16)
This implies
(Ω˜j − Ωj)/Ωj = a− 1. (17)
Inserting (16) and (17) into the Bellman equation (12) and (13) yields
1/ϕj = r + (1− a)λ(L− lj) > 0. (18)
Inserting (16) and (17) into the first-order conditions (14) and (15) yields
mj
Ωj
∂Φj
∂mj
=
1
ϕj
[
mjfm(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
− δmj
mj +m−j
]
= 0,
lj
Ωj
∂Φj
∂lj
=
1
ϕj
ljfl(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
− (a− 1)λlj = 0. (19)
Because there is symmetry throughout all countries j = 1, ..., n in the
model, it is true that all countries have equal emissions mj = m in equilib-
rium. Inserting this into (18) and (19) and noting (1), (7) and (10) yield
ξ
(mj
lj
)
.
=
mjfm(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
=
δmj
mj +m−j
=
δ
n
∈ (0, 1), (20)
(a− 1)λlj =
[
r + (1− a)λ(L− lj)
] ljfl
f
=
[
r + (1− a)λ(L− lj)
][
1− mjfm
f
]
=
[
r + (1− a)λ(L− lj)
]
(1− δ/n). (21)
Solving for mj/lj from (20) and lj from (21) yields
mj
lj
= ξ−1
( δ
n
)
.
= ϕ(n),
dϕ
dn
= − δ
n2ξ′
=
{
< 0 for σ > 1,
> 0 for 0 < σ < 1,
lj = l(n)
.
=
r + (1− a)λL
(a− 1)λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(n
δ
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
> 0, r + (1− a)λL > 0, l′ > 0,
z(n) = L− l(n), z′ < 0, mj = m(n) .= ϕ(n)l(n),
m′ = lϕ′ + ϕl′ > 0 for 0 < σ < 1. (22)
These results can be rephrased as follows:
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Proposition 2 A higher level of centralization (i.e. a decrease in n)
(a) decreases the level of output, lj (i.e. l
′ > 0), but increases the growth
rate, zj (i.e. z
′ < 0),
(b) decreases emissions mj unambiguously (i.e. m
′ > 0), when labor and
emissions are gross complements, 0 < σ < 1,
(c) increases emissions per labor input, mj/lj (i.e. ϕ
′ < 0), when labor and
emissions are gross substitutes, σ > 1.
A higher level of centralization helps to internalize the effect of pollution.
In that case, the local planners alleviate pollution by transferring resources
from production into R&D. This decreases output, but speeds up economic
growth. When labor and emissions are gross complements, the decrease of
labor in production decreases emissions as well. When labor and emissions
are gross substitutes, labor transferred from production into R&D is partly
replaced by emissions. This increases the emissions-labor ratio in production.
5 Pareto optimum
Assume a benevolent central planner which has enough instruments to trans-
fer income between countries.2 Because the countries do not pay political
contributions to a benevolent planner, Rj = 0 for all j, and because such a
planner can internalize the externality of pollution entirely, the outcome is
the Pareto optimum where the union behaves as if there were one jurisdiction
only, n = 1. Noting (22), labor input in production at the Pareto optimum
is given by
l(1)
.
=
r + (1− a)λL
(a− 1)λ
(1
δ
− 1
)
. (23)
Furthermore, proposition 2 has the following corollary:
Proposition 3 The growth rate z is the highest at the Pareto optimum.
2In the model, it would be sufficient if the central planner could tax consumption in al
countries at any rate and then use the revenue for subsidizing R&D.
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For the remainder of this paper, I assume that the central planner is self-
interested, not benevolent. In section 6, I assume that the central planner
taylors a specific emission quotamj for each country, but the countries cannot
trade with these quotas. In section 7, I introduce emission trade.
6 Lobbying with emission quotas
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), I assume that the central planner
of the union has its own interests and collects political contributions. Local
planner j in each country j ∈ {1, ..., n} pays political contributions Rj to the
central planner which decides on a specific emission quotamj for each country
j ∈ {1, ..., n}. The order of this common agency game is the following. First,
the local planners set their political contributions (R1, ..., Rn) conditional
on the central planner’s prospective policy (m1, ...,mn). Second, the central
planners sets the quotas (m1, ...,mn) and collect the contributions for its
personal consumption. Third, the local planners maximize their utilities
given the level of political contributions (R1, ..., Rn). This game is solved in
reversed order as follows. Subsection 6.1 considers a local planner, subsection
6.2 the central planner and subsection 6.3 the political equilibrium.
6.1 The local planners
Local planner j maximizes its utility (8) by labor input lj subject to Poisson
technological change (9) on the assumption that the interest rate r, the quotas
m1, ...,mn, pollution P =
∑
j mj [cf. (3)] and and its political contributions
Rj are kept constant. It is equivalent to maximize
E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf(lj,mj)P
−δe−r(t−T )dt
by lj subject to (9), given r, mj, P and Rj. The value of the optimal program
for local planner j starting at time T can then be defined as follows:
Γj(γj,mj, P, T ) = max
lj s.t. (9)
E
∫ ∞
T
aγjf(lj,mj)P
−δe−r(t−T )dt. (24)
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I denote Γj = Γj(γj,mj, P, T ) and Γ˜
j = Γj(γj + 1, ,mj, P, T ). The Bell-
man equation corresponding to the optimal program (24) is
rΓj = max
lj
Ψj(lj, γj,mj, P, T ), (25)
where
Ψj(lj, γj,mj, P, T ) = a
γjf(lj,mj)P
−δ + λ(L− lj)
[
Γ˜j − Γj]. (26)
This leads to the first-order condition
∂Ψj
∂lj
= aγjfl(lj,mj)P
−δ − λ[Γ˜j − Γj] = 0. (27)
To solve the dynamic program, I try the solution that the value of the
program, Γj, is in fixed proportion ϑj > 0 to instantaneous utility:
Γj(γj,mj, P, T ) = ϑja
γjf(lj,mj)P
−δ,
∂Γj
∂mj
=
fm(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
Γj,
∂Γj
∂P
= −δΓ
j
P
.
(28)
This implies
(Γ˜j − Γj)/Γj = a− 1. (29)
Inserting (28) and (29) into the Bellman equation (25) and (26) yields
1/ϑj = r + (1− a)λ(L− lj) > 0. (30)
Inserting (28), (29) and (30) into the first-order conditions (27) and noting
(7), one obtains
lj
Γj
∂Ψj
∂lj
=
1
ϑj
ljfl(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
− (a− 1)λlj = 1
ϑj
[
1− ξ
(mj
lj
)]
− (a− 1)λlj
=
[
r + (1− a)λ(L− lj)
][
1− ξ
(mj
lj
)]
− (a− 1)λlj = 0. (31)
Noting (3), (7), (24) and (28), local planner j’s utility (8) becomes
Υj(Rj,m1, ...,mn) = Γ
j(γj,mj, P, T )−
∫ ∞
T
Rje
−r(t−T )dt
= Γj(γj,mj, P, T )−Rj/r,
∂Υj
∂mj
=
∂Γj
∂mj
+
∂Γj
∂P
∂P
∂mj
= Γj
[
fm(lj,mj)
f(lj,mj)
− δ
P
∂P
∂mj
]
=
Γj
mj
[
ξ
(mj
lj
)
− δmj
P
]
,
∂Υj
∂mk
=
∂Γj
∂P
∂P
∂mk
= −δΓ
j
P
∂P
∂mk
= −δΓ
j
P
for k 6= j, ∂Υ
j
∂Rj
= −1
r
. (32)
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6.2 The self-interested central planner
The present value the expected flow of the real political contributions Rj
from all countries j at time T is given by
E
∫ ∞
T
n∑
j=1
Rje
−r(θ−T )dθ. (33)
Given this, (3) and (32), I specify the central planner’s utility function as:
G(m1, ...,mn, R1, ..., Rn)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
n∑
j=1
Rje
−r(θ−T )dθ +
n∑
j=1
ζjΥ
j(Rj,m1, ...,mn)
=
1
r
n∑
j=1
Rj +
n∑
j=1
ζjΥ
j(Rj,m1, ...,mn), (34)
where constants ζj ≥ 0 are the weight of planner j’s welfare in the central
planner’s preferences. Grossman and Helpman’s (1994a) objective function
(34) is widely used in models of common agency and it has been justified
as follows. The politicians are mainly interested in their own income which
consists of the contributions from the public,
∑
j Rj, but because they must
defend their position in general elections, they must sometimes take the util-
ities of the interest groups Υj into account directly. The linearity of (34) in∑
j Rj is assumed, for simplicity.
6.3 The political equilibrium
Each local planner j tries to affect the central planner by its contributions Rj.
The contribution schedules are therefore functions of the central planner’s
policy variables (= the emission quotas mj):
Rj(m1, ...,mn), j = 1, ..., n. (35)
Following proposition 1 of Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for this game is a set of contribution schedules
Rj(m1, ...,mn) and a policy (m1, ...,mn) such that the following conditions
(i)− (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Rj are non-negative but no more than the contributor’s
income, Υj ≥ 0.
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(ii) The policy (m1, ...,mn) maximizes the central planner’s welfare (34)
taking the contribution schedules Rj as given,
(m1, ...,mn)
∈ arg max
m1,...,mn
G
(
m1, ...,mn, R1(m1, ...,mn), ..., Rn(m1, ...,mn)
)
; (36)
(iii) Local planner j cannot have a feasible strategy Rj(m1, ...,mn) that
yields it a higher level of utility than in equilibrium, given the central
planner’s anticipated decision rule,
(m1, ...,mn) = arg max
m1,...,mn
Υj
(
Rj(m1, ...,mn),m1, ...,mn
)
. (37)
(iv) Local planner j provides the central planner at least with the level
of utility than in the case it offers nothing (Rj = 0), and the central
planner responds optimally given the other local planners contribution
functions,
G
(
m1, ...,mn, R1(m1, ...,mn), ..., Rn(m1, ...,mn)
)
≥ max
m1,...,mn
G
(
m1, ...,mn, R1(m1, ...,mn), ..., Rj−1(m1, ...,mn), 0,
Rj+1(m1, ...,mn), ..., Rn(m1, ...,mn)
)
.
Noting (32), the conditions (37) are equivalent to
0 =
∂Υj
∂Rj
∂Rj
∂mk
+
∂Υj
∂mj
= −1
r
∂Rj
∂mk
+
∂Υj
∂mk
for all k,
and
∂Rj
∂mj
= r
∂Υj
∂mj
= r
Γj
mj
[
ξ
(mj
lj
)
− δmj
P
]
,
∂Rj
∂mk
= −rδΓ
j
P
for k 6= j.
Given these equations, one obtains
∂
∂mk
n∑
j=1
Rj =
n∑
j=1
∂Rj
∂mk
=
∂Rk
∂mk
+
∑
j 6=k
∂Rj
∂mk
= r
Γk
mk
[
ξ
(mk
lk
)
− δmk
P
]
−
∑
j 6=k
rδΓj
P
= r
Γk
mk
[
ξ
(mk
lk
)
− δmk
P
1
Γk
n∑
j=1
Γj
]
.
(38)
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Noting (35) and (37), the central planner’s utility function (34) becomes
G(m1, ...,mn) .= G
(
m1, ...,mn, R1(m1, ...,mn), ..., Rn(m1, ...,mn)
)
=
1
r
n∑
j=1
Rj(m1, ...,mn) +
n∑
j=1
ζj max
m1,...,mn
Υj
(
Rj(m1, ...,mn),m1, ...,mn
)
.
(39)
Noting (38) and (63), the equilibrium conditions (36) are equivalent to the
first-order conditions
∂G
∂mk
=
1
r
∂
∂mk
n∑
j=1
Rj =
Γk
mk
[
ξ
(mk
lk
)
− δmk
P
1
Γk
n∑
j=1
Γj
]
= 0 for all k. (40)
The political equilibrium is now specified by the equilibrium conditions
(31) for all local planners j = 1, ..., n plus those (40) for the central planner.
In this system, there are 2n unknowns, (lj,mj) for j = 1, ..., n. I assume, for
simplicity, uniform initial productivity in the union, γk = γ1 for all k 6= 1.
In the system, noting (28), this yields perfect symmetry lj = l, mk = m and
Γj = Γ for the countries j = 1, ..., n in equilibrium. Given this and (3), the
equilibrium conditions (31) and (40) change into
ξ
(mj
lj
)
=
δmk
P
1
Γk
n∑
j=1
Γj = δ
mk
P
n = δ,
(a− 1)λlj
r + (1− a)λ(L− lj) = 1−
mfm
f
= 1− ξ = 1− δ. (41)
The results (41) are the same as the result (20) and (21) with n = 1. This
shows that m, l and z = L− l are the same as at the Pareto optimum (23):
Proposition 4 In the case of lobbying with given emission quotas, emissions
m and the growth rate z are socially optimal.
The introduction of the central planner as a decision maker for emissions
eliminates the externality through pollution. This effect is the same for both
a benevolent and a self-interested central planner.
In the case of lobbying, the countries pay political contributions, Rj >
0 for all j, while in the case of Pareto-optimal policy, there are no such
contributions, Rj = 0 for all j. If the central planner consists of different
12
households than the rest of the population (even partly), one can define
political contributions are a waste from the viewpoint of the latter. Thus,
there is the following corollary for proposition 4:
Proposition 5 In the case of lobbying with given emission quotas, welfare
is sub-optimal.
7 Lobbying with emission trade
In this section, I assume that the central planner defines a quota for each
country’s emissions, but the countries can trade emissions among themselves.
To enable a stationary state equilibrium in the model, I assume that the
quotas are in fixed proportion to the level of productivity aγj so that more
advances countries get tighter restrictions. Therefore, the quota for country
j’s productivity-adjusted emissions mja
γj is given by qj. When country j
has excess quotas, qj > mja
γj , it can sell the difference qj − mjaγj to the
other members of the union at the price p. Correspondingly, when country j
has excess emissions, mja
γj − qj, it must buy the difference mjaγj − qj from
other countries at the price p. At the level of the whole union, productivity-
adjusted emissions
∑n
j=1mja
γj are equal to total quotas
∑n
j=1 qj,
n∑
j=1
mja
γj =
n∑
j=1
qj. (42)
Local planner j in each country j ∈ {1, ..., n} pays political contributions
Rj to the central planner. The order of this common agency game is the fol-
lowing. First, the local planners set their political contributions (R1, ..., Rn)
conditional on the central planner’s prospective policy (q1, ..., qn). Second,
the central planners sets the quotas (q1, ..., qn) and collect the contributions
for its personal consumption. Third, the local planners maximize their utili-
ties given the level of political contributions (R1, ..., Rn). This game is solved
in reversed order as follows. Subsection 7.1 considers a local planner, sub-
section 7.2 the central planner and subsection 7.3 the political equilibrium.
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7.1 The local planners
Planner j’s utility starting at time T , (8), can be extended into
Υj
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
[
aγjf(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ + p
(
qj −mjaγj
)−Rj]e−r(t−T )dt,
(43)
where p(qj − mjaγj) is country j’s net income from emission trade. Local
planner j maximizes its utility (43) by labor input lj and emissionsmj subject
to Poisson technological change (9) on the assumption that the interest rate
r, the quotas q1, ..., qn, the emission price p, emissions in the rest of the union,
m−j, and its political contributions Rj are kept constant. It is equivalent to
maximize ∫ ∞
T
aγj
[
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ − pmj
]
e−r(t−T )dt
by (lj,mj) subject to (9), given r, q1, ..., qn, p, m−j and Rj. The value of the
optimal program for local planner j can then be defined as follows:
Γj(γj, p,m−j, T )
= max
(mj , lj) s.t. (9)
E
∫ ∞
T
aγj
[
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ − pmj
]
e−r(t−T )dt. (44)
I denote Γj = Γj(γj, p,m−j, T ) and Γ˜j = Γj(γj + 1, p,m−j, T ). The
Bellman equation corresponding to the optimal program (44) is
rΓj = max
lj ,mj
Ψj(lj, γj, p,m−j, T ), (45)
where
Ψj(lj, γj, p,m−j, T )
= aγj
[
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ − pmj
]
+ λ(L− lj)
[
Γ˜j − Γj]. (46)
This leads to the first-order conditions
∂Ψj
∂mj
= aγj
[
fm(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− δf(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ+1
− p
]
= 0, (47)
∂Ψj
∂lj
=
aγjfl(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− λ[Γ˜j − Γj] = 0. (48)
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I try the solution that the value of the program, Γj, is given by
Γj(γj, p,m−j, T ) = ϑjaγj
[
f(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− pmj
]
,
∂Γj
∂p
= −ϑjaγjmj, (49)
where ϑj > 0 is independent of the control variables. This implies
(Γ˜j − Γj)/Γj = a− 1. (50)
Inserting (49) and (50) into the Bellman equation (45) and (46) yields
1/ϑj = r + (1− a)λ(L− lj) > 0. (51)
Given (49), (50) and (51) the first-order conditions (47) and (48) change into
p =
fm(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− δf(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ+1
, (52)
1
Γj
∂Ψj
∂lj
=
r + (1− a)λ(L− lj)
f(lj,mj)(mj +m−j)−δ − pmj
fl(lj,mj)
(mj +m−j)δ
− (a− 1)λ = 0. (53)
7.2 The self-interested central planner
In the system (10), (52) and (53) for j = 1, .., n, there are 3n equations, 3n
unknown variables, lj, mj and m−j for j = 1, .., n, and the known variable p.
This and the symmetry throughout j = 1, ..., n imply
mj = m(p) and lj = l(p) for j = 1, ..., n. (54)
Inserting this into (42) yields
m(p)
n∑
`=1
aγ` =
∑
j=1
qj
and
p = m−1
( n∑
j=1
qj
/ n∑
`=1
aγ`
)
,
∂p
∂qj
=
1
m′
∑n
`=1 a
γ`
, (55)
where m−1 is the inverse function of m.
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Noting (44), (49) and (55), Local planner j’s utility (43) changes into
∆j(Rj, q1, ..., qn) = Υ
j = Γj(γj, p,m−j, T ) +
∫ ∞
T
(pqj −Rj)e−r(t−T )dt
= Γj(γj, p,m−j, T ) +
1
r
(pqj −Rj), ∂∆
j
∂Rj
= −1
r
,
∂∆j
∂qj
=
p
r
+
(
qj
r
+
∂Γj
∂p
)
∂p
∂qj
=
p
r
+
(
qj
r
− ϑjaγjmj
)
∂p
∂qj
=
p
r
+
qj/r −mjaγjϑj
m′
∑n
`=1 a
γ`
,
∂∆j
∂qk
=
(
qj
r
+
∂Γj
∂p
)
∂p
∂qk
=
qj/r −mjaγjϑj
m′
∑n
`=1 a
γ`
for k 6= j. (56)
From the conditions (51), (52) and (53) it follows that labor input lj and
emissions mj in production are constant over time for all countries j.
The local planners j = 1, ..., n lobby the central planner which decides on
the emission quotas (q1, ..., qn). Following Grossman and Helpman (1994),
I assume that the central planner has its own interests and collects contri-
butions (R1, ..., Rn) from the local planners. Given this, I specify Grossman
and Helpman’s (1994) utility function for the central planner as follows:
G(q1, ..., qn, R1, ..., Rn)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
n∑
j=1
Rje
−r(θ−T )dθ +
n∑
j=1
ζj∆
j(Rj, q1, ..., qn)
=
1
r
n∑
j=1
Rj +
n∑
j=1
ζj∆
j(Rj, q1, ..., qn), (57)
where constants ζj ≥ 0 is the weight of planner j’s welfare.
7.3 The political equilibrium
Each local planner j tries to affect the central planner by its contributions Rj.
The contribution schedules are therefore functions of the central planner’s
policy variables, the emission quotas mj:
Rj(q1, ..., qn), j = 1, ..., n. (58)
The central planner maximizes its utility function (57) by (q1, ..., qn), given
the contribution schedules (58). A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this
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game is a set of contribution schedulesRj(q1, ..., qn) and policy (q1, ..., qn) such
that the conditions (i)− (iv) in subsection 6.3 hold, with (m1, ...,mn) being
replaced by (q1, ..., qn). Thus, it must be true that ∆j ≥ 0 and
(q1, ..., qn) ∈ arg max
q1,...,qn
G
(
q1, ..., qn, R1(q1, ..., qn), ..., Rn(q1, ..., qn)
)
; (59)
(q1, ..., qn) = arg max
q1,...,qn
∆j
(
Rj(q1, ..., qn), q1, ..., qn
)
. (60)
G
(
q1, ..., qn, R1(q1, ..., qn), ..., Rn(q1, ..., qn)
)
≥ max
q1,...,qn
G
(
q1, ..., qn, R1(q1, ..., qn), ..., Rj−1(q1, ..., qn), 0,
Rj+1(q1, ..., qn), ..., Rn(q1, ..., qn)
)
.
Noting (56), the conditions (60) are equivalent to
0 =
∂∆j
∂Rj
∂Rj
∂qk
+
∂∆j
∂qk
= −1
r
∂Rj
∂qk
+
∂∆j
∂qk
for all j and k,
and
∂Rj
∂qj
= r
∂∆j
∂qj
= p+
qj − rmaγjϑj
m′
∑n
`=1 a
γ`
,
∂Rj
∂qk
= r
∂∆j
∂qk
=
qj − rmaγjϑj
m′
∑n
`=1 a
γ`
for k 6= j,
(61)
which suggests that in equilibrium the change in the lobby’s contribution
(Rj) due to a change in quota mj is equal to the change in the lobby’s rent
∆j due to this same fact, holding the contribution Rj constant.
Given (1), (3), (51) and (54), it is true that mj = m, m−j = (n − 1)m,
lj = l, zj = z = L− l, ϑj = ϑ and P = nm. In the stationary state, all these
variables must be kept constant over time. Given (54) and (55), the ratio
n∑
j=1
qj
/ n∑
`=1
aγ` = m
is then kept constant over time. This is true, if qj = ma
γj for all j. Thus, in
the vicinity of the stationary state, from (51), (54) and (61) it follows that
∂
∂qk
n∑
j=1
Rj =
∂Rk
∂qk
+
∑
j 6=k
∂Rj
∂qk
= p+
qk − rmaγkϑk
m′
∑n
`=1 a
γ`
+
∑
j 6=k
qk − rmaγkϑk
m′
∑n
`=1 a
γ`
= p+
n∑
j=1
qk − rϑkmaγk
m′
∑n
`=1 a
γ`
= p+
n∑
j=1
(1− rϑ)maγk
m′
∑n
`=1 a
γ`
= p+ (1− rϑ)m
m′
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= p+
[
1− r
1 + (1− a)λ(L− l)
]
m
m′
= p+
(1− a)λ(L− l)
1 + (1− a)λ(L− l)
m(p)
m′(p)
. (62)
Noting (58) and (60), the central planner’s utility function (57) becomes
G(q1, ..., qn) .= G
(
q1, ..., qn, R1(q1, ..., qn), ..., Rn(q1, ..., qn)
)
=
1
r
n∑
j=1
Rj(q1, ..., qn) +
n∑
j=1
ζj max
q1,...,qn
∆j
(
Rj(q1, ..., qn), q1, ..., qn
)
. (63)
Noting (62) and (63), the equilibrium conditions (59) are equivalent to
∂G
∂qk
=
1
r
∂
∂qk
n∑
j=1
Rj = p+
(1− a)λ(L− l)
1 + (1− a)λ(L− l)
m(p)
m′(p)
= 0.
Thus, the equilibrium price p is determined by
pm′(p)
m(p)
=
(a− 1)λ(L− l)
1 + (1− a)λ(L− l) .
Given (7), local planner j’s first-order conditions (52) and (53) become
ξ
(m
l
)
=
mfm(l,m)
f(l,m)
= δ
m
P
+
pmP δ
f
=
δ
n
+
pmP δ
f(l,m)
>
δ
n
, (64)
1− ξ
(m
l
)
=
lfl(l,m)
f(l,m)
=
(a− 1)λl
r + (1− a)λ(L− l)
[
1− pmP
δ
f(l,m)
]
=
(a− 1)λl
r + (1− a)λ(L− l)
[
1− ξ
(m
l
)
+
δ
n
]
,
l =
r + (1− a)λL
(a− 1)λ
1− ξ(m/l)
δ/n
<
r + (1− a)λL
(a− 1)λ
(n
δ
− 1
)
. (65)
The comparison of the equilibrium in the case of laissez-faire, (20) and (21),
to that in the case of emission trade, (64) and (65), shows the following.
First, l is equal to
r + (1− a)λL
(a− 1)λ
(n
δ
− 1
)
(66)
in the case of laissez-faire, but smaller than (66) in the case of emission trade.
Second, in the case of no emission policy, the function ξ(m/l) is equal to δ
n
,
but in the case of emission trade, it higher than δ
n
. Because ξ′ > 0 (< 0)
for σ > 1 (0 < σ < 1) by (7), it follows that m/l is bigger (smaller) with
emission trade than in with laissez-faire for σ > 1 (0 < σ < 1). These results
can be rephrased as follows:
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Proposition 6 In the lobbying equilibrium with emission trade,
(a) the level of employment in production, l, is lower, but the growth rate
z = L− l higher,
(b) the level of emissions, m, is lower when labor and emissions are gross
complements (i.e. 0 < σ < 1),
(c) the emissions-labor ratio m/l is higher when labor and emissions are
gross substitutes (i.e. σ > 1),
than with laissez-faire.
With emission trade, one more unit of R&D costs less in terms of lost output.
Thus, emission trade boosts R&D and decreases labor in production. When
labor and emissions are gross complements, a smaller labor input in produc-
tion leads to smaller emissions as well. When labor and emissions are gross
substitutes, labor transferred from production into R&D is partly replaced
by emissions and the emissions-labor ratio increases.
Finally, given (23), l is bigger and the growth rate z = N − l smaller in
the case of lobbying with emission trade than in at Pareto optimum if and
only if
r + (1− a)λL
(a− 1)λ
1− ξ
δ/n
>
r + (1− a)λL
(a− 1)λ
(1
δ
− 1
)
.
This is equivalent to n > (1 − δ)/(1 − ξ). The proportion of emissions
in technology, ξ
.
= mfm/f , is very likely less than
1
2
, and the elasticity of
output with respect to pollution through abatement, δ, cannot be greater
than one. Thus, with a large enough number of countries, n, it is true that
n > 2(1− δ) ≥ (1− δ)/(1− ξ) and I conclude:
Proposition 7 In the lobbying equilibrium with emission trade, the growth
rate z is sub-optimal.
Because with emission trade the levels of emissions are decided at the level of
countries rather than at the level of the union, the externality through pol-
lution cannot be internalized. Consequently, the growth rate is then smaller
than at the Pareto optimum.
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8 Conclusions
A higher level of centralization decreases the level of output, but increases
the growth rate, increases emissions per labor input, when labor and emis-
sions are gross substitutes, and decreases the level of emissions unambigu-
ously, when labor and emissions are gross complements. A higher level of
centralization helps to internalize the effect of pollution. In that case, a
local planner alleviates pollution by transferring resources from production
into R&D. This will speed up economic growth. When labor and emissions
are gross substitutes, the transfer of resources from production into R&D
is partly outweighed by higher emissions so that the emissions-labor ratio
in production rises. When labor and emissions are gross complements, the
decrease of labor in production decreases emissions as well.
In Pareto optimum, the union of countries behaves as if there were only
one jurisdiction. Given the result above, the level of output is then at the
lowest, but the growth rate at the highest level in Pareto optimum. Further-
more, increases emissions per labor input are at the highest level, when labor
and emissions are gross substitutes, but the level of emissions at the lowest
level, when labor and emissions are gross complements in Pareto optimum.
In the case of lobbying with given emission quotas, the emissions-labor
ratio, the growth rate, total consumption and pollution are the same as in
the case of Pareto-optimal policy. The introduction of the central planner as
a decision maker for emissions eliminates the externality through pollution.
This effect is the same for both a benevolent and a self-interested central
planner. On the other hand, the welfare is lower in the case of lobbying with
given emission quotas than in the case of Pareto-optimal policy. In the case
of lobbying, the countries pay political contributions, while in the case of
Pareto-optimal policy, there are no such contributions. If the central planner
consists of different households than the rest of the population (even partly),
political contributions are a waste from the viewpoint of the latter.
With emission trade, one more unit of R&D costs less in terms of lost
output. Thus, emission trade boosts R&D and decreases labor in production.
When labor and emissions are gross complements, a smaller labor input in
production leads to smaller emissions as well. When labor and emissions
are gross substitutes, labor transferred from production into R&D is partly
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replaced by emissions and the emissions-labor ratio increases. Because with
emission trade the levels of emissions are decided at the level of countries
rather than at the level of the union, the externality through pollution cannot
be internalized. Consequently, the growth rate is then smaller than at the
Pareto optimum.
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